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Abstract*
 
Contrary to both Preliminary Convention Drafts on insolvency proceedings, the Insolvency Regulation 
does not set out a specific rule on vis attractiva concursus. This silence is surprising given the fact that 
the ECJ had already held in the leading case Gourdain vs. Nadler that decisions deriving directly from 
insolvency proceedings, and closely connected with them, are not included within the scope of the Brussels 
Convention. The Regulation’s silence and the fact that these claims were excluded from the Brussels 
Convention, now the Brussels I Regulation, had given rise to different interpretations, to which the ECJ 
has now put an end by stating in Seagon vs. Deko Marty Belgium that Article 3 of the Insolvency 
Regulation sets out the vis attractiva concursus principle. Moreover, this case has been immediately 
followed by SCT Industri vs. Alpenblume, and German Graphics vs. A. van der Schee, both cases 
with the same background, i.e. to determine which claims are within the scope of the Insolvency Regulation 
and, therefore, they have to be brought before the forum concursus. This paper tackles this background 
and the state of the question after Seagon vs. Deko Marty Belgium: the list of claims attracted by the 
forum concursus, deliberately not laid down by the Insolvency Regulation, is now to be compiled by the 
ECJ. 
 
A diferencia de los dos precedentes proyectos de Convención sobre procedimientos de insolvencia, el 
Reglamento (CE) núm. 1346/2000 no establece una regla específica sobre vis attractiva concursus; y ello 
a pesar de que el Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas ya había sostenido en el caso Gourdain 
c. Nadler que las acciones que derivan directamente de la insolvencia y guardan una inmediata relación con 
el concurso no están incluidas en el ámbito de aplicación de la Convención de Bruselas. El silencio del 
Reglamento de insolvencia y el hecho de que las acciones mencionadas estuvieran excluidas de la 
Convención de Bruselas, ahora Reglamento Bruselas I, motivaron diversas interpretaciones, a las que ahora 
ha puesto término el Alto Tribunal al establecer en Seagon c. Deko Marty Belgium que el artículo 3 del 
Reglamento de insolvencia contiene el principio de vis attractiva. Ahondando en esta dirección, esta 
decisión ha ido inmediatamente seguida por otras dos, SCT Industri c. Alpenblume, y German 
Graphics c. A. van der Schee, con el mismo telón de fondo, esto es, determinar qué acciones están 
incluidas en el ámbito de aplicación del Reglamento núm. 1346/2000 y, por tanto, han de ser atraídas ante 
el forum concursus. Este trabajo aborda esta problemática y el estado de la cuestión después de Seagon c. 
Deko Marty Belgium, puesto que la relación de acciones comprendidas en el foro concursal, omitida 
deliberadamente por el legislador comunitario en la redacción del Reglamento de insolvencia, ha de ser 
realizada ahora por el Tribunal de Justicia. 
 
Título: La vis attractiva concursus en la Unión Europea: su construcción por el Tribunal de Justicia de las 
Comunidades Europeas 
 
Keywords: vis attractiva concursus, forum concursus, avoidance proceedings, actio pauliana, insolvency proceedings, 
international jurisdiction 
Palabras clave: vis attractiva concursus, forum concursus, acciones de reintegración de la masa, acción pauliana, 
procedimientos de insolvencia, competencia judicial internacional 
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1. Introduction 
Regulation (EC) Nr. 1346/2000, of 29th May, on insolvency proceedings, is a main achievement 
of the European Union as the increasing of judicial cooperation in cross-border insolvencies 
illustrates. Such a success has been nevertheless accompanied by some pitfalls in the application 
of this Regulation, having some of them already reached the European Court of Justice 
(hereinafter, ECJ). Now it is the turn of the vis attractiva concursus principle, that is to say, to 
decide whether ancillary proceedings may be attracted to, and brought before, the forum 
concursus. This issue is not directly addressed by the Insolvency Regulation, although it was 
taken into account by the European legislator, as the Preliminary Convention Drafts on 
insolvency proceedings acknowledged. The idea of issuing a Convention on insolvency 
proceedings was already present in the Community while issuing the Convention of 27th 
September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (hereinafter, Brussels Convention). This is why ‘bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the 
winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions 
and analogous proceedings’ are not included in the Brussels Convention.1 And it is also the 
starting point for a debate on how cross-border insolvencies should be regulated in the 
Community. Two Preliminary Drafts were produced regarding this debate, both of them 
containing rules on a weakened version of the vis attractiva concursus principle, which detailed in 
which cases the attraction to forum concursus is allowed.2 Meanwhile, the ECJ had to decide with 
the leading case Gourdain vs. Nadler3 whether a French action en comblement du passif, namely a 
liability claim similar to the English claim on wrongful trading, was to be considered a 
bankruptcy matter and, therefore, excluded from the Brussels Convention. Article 1(2)(2) of the 
Brussels Convention did not mention claims related to the insolvency, but the ECJ held that such 
actions ‘must be considered as given in the context of bankruptcy’ and, therefore, excluded from 
the Brussels Convention.  
 
Once stated that neither insolvency proceedings nor claims arising from them were included in 
the Brussels Convention, the next step was to issue a European instrument on insolvency 
proceedings. That instrument, and the compromise that it involved, was achieved in 1995, when 
the Brussels Convention on insolvency proceedings was issued; it never came into force until it 
turned into the Insolvency Regulation, which only lays down jurisdiction rules on the opening of 
insolvency proceedings, either universal or territorial, ignoring other claims. Moreover, the 1995 
Brussels Convention was accompanied by an Explanatory Report, which pointed out that, unlike 
the 1982 Community Draft Convention which set out a rule on vis attractiva concursus, ‘neither 
this precept nor this philosophy has been adopted in this Convention. There is no provision in 
                                                        
1Article 1(II)(2) of the Brussels Convention. 
 
2See on the history of the Insolvency Regulation FLETCHER (2005, paras. 7.03-23). 
 
3ECJ 22nd February 1979, Case 133/78, Gourdain c. Nadler, Rec. 1979, pp. 733-756 
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Article 3 of the Convention addressing this problem’.4 Nevertheless, this Report acknowledged 
that the Insolvency Convention, and thus the Insolvency Regulation, contains in Article 25 the 
doctrine set up by Gourdain vs. Nadler, so that claims ‘deriving directly from the insolvency 
proceedings and which are closely linked with them’ are excluded from the Brussels Convention, 
but included in the Insolvency Convention. As the Report said, ‘logically, to avoid unjustifiable 
loopholes between the two Conventions, these actions are now subject to the Convention on 
insolvency proceedings and to the rules of jurisdiction’.5
 
The exclusion of claims arising out of insolvency proceedings from the Brussels Convention, now 
the Brussels I Regulation,6 the Insolvency Regulation’s silence on the matter and the 
contradictory statements of the aforementioned Explanatory Report have resulted in a lively 
debate, where three different interpretations have been proposed in order to solve the enigma, as 
explained in the second part of this paper. These interpretations have threatened the uniform 
application of European Regulations and led to a gridlock, making it necessary for the 
Community to intervene. This has taken place at the hands of the ECJ, in the case Seagon vs. Deko 
Marty Belgium.7 The third part of this paper examines the background of this case as well as its 
ruling stating that Article 3 of the Insolvency Regulation acknowledges the vis attractiva concursus 
principle.   
 
The main reason to back such an interpretation is, of course, that Article 25 of the Insolvency 
Regulation takes for granted Gourdain vs. Nadler and, as expected, the ECJ has remained faithful 
to its own doctrine.8 But it does not end the debate. Further development is still required in order 
to establish which claims are comprehended by the vis attractiva concursus, an issue which is 
tackled in the fourth part of this paper. It seems that the list of claims, deliberately not laid down 
by the Insolvency Regulation, has to be compiled by the ECJ, which has already released two 
more judgments with this background, SCT Industri vs. Alpenblume,9 and German Graphics vs. A. 
van der Schee.10 Eventually and given the fact that the Insolvency Regulation only sets out 
international jurisdiction rules, some words must be said on vis attractiva concursus as territorial 
                                                        
4See VIRGOS, SCHMIT Report, para. 77. 
 
5See VIRGOS, SCHMIT Report, para. 77. 
 
6Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters. 
 
7ECJ 12th February 2009, Case C 339/07, Christopher Seagon vs. Deko Marty Belgium NV. 
 
8See CARBALLO PIÑEIRO (2008, pp. 185-202). 
 
9ECJ 2nd July 2009, Case C-111/08, SCT Industri AB I likvidation vs. Alpenblume AB 
 
10ECJ 10th September 2009, C-292/08, German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH vs. A. van der Schee, acting as 
liquidator of Holland Binding BV. 
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jurisdiction criterion. All in all, it seems that eight years after the introduction of the Insolvency 
Regulation it might be time to reform some issues that the abundant jurisprudence has disclosed, 
especially in order to clarify the issue at hand. 
 
 
2. The Silence of the Insolvency Regulation on the Vis attractiva concursus Principle 
 
The only rule on international jurisdiction laid down by the Insolvency Regulation regards the 
opening of insolvency proceedings, either universal or territorial.11 But it does not mention 
jurisdiction on claims related to the bankruptcy, and closely connected with such proceedings, as 
was expected since the ECJ had stated that such decisions are outside the scope of the Brussels 
Convention, now the Brussels I Regulation.12 The immediate conclusion to be drawn from this 
silence is that the issue has been laid aside from the Insolvency Regulation as well, to be decided 
by national laws:13 Member states have different approaches to vis attractiva concursus – some of 
them, like Spain, applying for a quasi-absolute attraction to the forum concursus, others, like 
Germany, holding its lack of conformity with due process rights – and this background seems to 
have been the reason why it was impossible to reach an agreement regarding the scope of vis 
attractiva concursus in the former Preliminary Drafts;14 consequently, the European legislator 
decided not to tackle the issue just for the sake of delivering an instrument on insolvency 
proceedings, thus submitting the controversy to national laws. 
 
But this approach poses many problems. First of all, it challenges the fact that both Regulations 
were conceived so as not to leave room for loopholes.15 In fact, there is an apparent contradiction 
in the Insolvency Regulation between rules on international jurisdiction and on recognition and 
enforcement of judgments; Article 25(1) does not ignore ancillary proceedings and lays down that 
decisions rendered in such proceedings shall be enforced according to the exequatur established 
by the Brussels Convention (literal reference, which nowadays has to be read as saying the 
Brussels I Regulation) with the exception of Articles 27 and 28 (Articles 34 and 35 of the Brussels I 
Regulation); both Articles set out the non recognition causes, restricted by the Insolvency 
Regulation to only one, the ordre public clause.16 This lack of correspondence between jurisdiction 
                                                        
11See Article 3 of the Insolvency Regulation. 
 
12See Gourdain vs. Nadler, para. 4. 
 
13See CALVO CARAVACA and CARRASCOSA GONZÁLEZ (2004, pp. 97-100); DE CESARI (2003, pp. 68-70); CORSINI (2008, 
pp. 429-446); DORDI (1997, pp. 348-351); GARCIMARTÍN ALFÉREZ (2001, pp. 265); HERCHEN (2000, pp. 228-229); 
KROPHOLLER (2005, pp. 82-88); OBERHAMMER (2002, p. 707); PUNZI (2003, p. 1020, n 50); SCHACK (2002, p. 450); 
SCHOLLMEYER (1998, p. 34); TRUNK (1999-2000 ed., pp. 839-840). 
 
14See on problems to reach a compromise JAHR (1988, pp. 305-317). 
 
15See VIRGOS, SCHMIT Report, para. 77. 
 
16See Article 26 of the Insolvency Regulation. 
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and enforcement is surprising; the simplification, and even elimination, of controls on exequatur is 
acceptable when accompanied by the harmonization of rules, such as those on international 
jurisdiction. But this does not seem the case in the Insolvency Regulation. Consequently, when 
national laws are applicable, any decision may be rendered on the grounds of exorbitant 
jurisdiction criteria and, nevertheless, it would have to be enforced by the special proceeding set 
up by the Brussels I Regulation.17  
 
Even when applicable national laws do not set out exorbitant criteria, their application poses 
problems due to differences among them, which lead to positive and negative conflicts of 
jurisdiction. The perfect example is the case which has triggered the direct intervention of the ECJ 
on the matter, Seagon vs. Deko Marty Belgium: the defendant is a Belgian society, to whom the 
debtor, a German society, transferred money to pay a debt the day before filling a petition in 
order to be declared insolvent.18 According to German law, avoidance proceedings have to be 
commenced before the courts of the defendant’s domicile, in this case Belgium; according to 
Belgian law, this proceeding falls within the attraction of insolvency court, in this case Germany. 
Belgian courts rejected the proceeding started by the German administrator, who eventually 
brought the matter before German courts, the ones who raised the question to the ECJ.  
 
The application of national laws to this issue is then unsatisfactory. Therefore, it is necessary to 
go back to the beginning, to both European Regulations, in order to search for alternatives. One 
option could be that the legislative silence on the Insolvency Regulation includes those 
proceedings within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation, meaning that the doctrine set out by 
Gourdain vs. Nadler has to be surpassed;19 thus, Article 1(2)(b) of the Brussels I Regulation only 
would exclude insolvency proceedings as mentioned in Annexes A and B of the Insolvency 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
17See LEIPOLD (2001, pp. 223-224, pp. 228-229); LÜKE (1999, p. 483); OBERHAMMER (2002, p. 706). For some scholards 
this contradiction is only apparent, because Article 4 of the Brussels I Regulation leads to the same situation. See 
BARIATTI (2009, pp. 653-654). 
 
18On 14th March 2002 the debtor transfers 50,000 € to a defendant’s bank account via the KBC Bank, in Düsseldorf. 
On 15th March 2002 the debtor applies for the opening of the insolvency proceeding, which is finally done by the 
Marburg Amtsgericht on 1st June 2002. The liquidator brings the avoidance proceeding before the Marburg 
Landsgericht, which dismissed having international jurisdiction. This decision is held by the Court of Appeals (see 
OLG Frankfurt, 26.1.2006, 15 U 200/05, ZIP 2006, p. 769-772, commented by HINKEL, FLITSCH (2006, pp. 237-238), 
and by THOLE (2006, pp. 1383-1387). The Insolvency Regulation came into force on 31st May 2002 (Article 47), but 
Article 43 sets out that it must be applicable only to proceedings opened after the aforementioned date, which is 
the case in Seagon v. Deko Marty Belgium. The same article further states that ‘Acts done by a debtor before the 
entry into force of this Regulation shall continue to be governed by the law which was applicable at the time they 
were done’; thus, the Insolvency Regulation might be applicable to determine the international jurisdiction, but 
not the law applicable to avoidance proceedings. 
 
19This is the interpretation chosen by the Court of Appeals in the case at hand, OLG Frankfurt, ZIP 2006, pp. 770-
772. See BERNER, KLÖHN (2007, p. 110); GEIMER (2005, para. 3561); KLÖHN, BERNER (2007, p. 1418); LÜKE (1999, pp. 
481-482); LÜKE (1998, pp. 292-295); REINHART (2003, p. 873); THOLE (2006, pp. 1386-1387).  
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Regulation, because the jurisdiction to open such proceedings is established by this instrument.20  
 
Notwithstanding, this interpretation has its own problems, especially the fact that the Insolvency 
Regulation takes Gourdain vs. Nadler for granted, i.e. the aforementioned Article 25 of the 
Insolvency Regulation submits the enforcement of judgments deriving directly from the 
insolvency proceedings to the Brussels I Regulation, comprehending these proceedings within its 
scope of application, albeit to submit the issue to another legal instrument. Besides, Article 25 
clearly reproduces the terms employed by the ECJ to delimit the scope of the Brussels 
Convention,21 terms which are also to be found in Recital 6 of the same Regulation: ‘In 
accordance with the principle of proportionality this Regulation should be confined to provisions 
governing jurisdiction for opening insolvency proceedings and judgments which are delivered 
directly on the basis of the insolvency proceedings and are closely connected with such 
proceedings’.  
 
The acceptance of Gourdain vs. Nadler leads to the inclusion of ancillary proceedings within the 
scope of the Insolvency Regulation; and, as this Regulation only lays down one rule on 
international jurisdiction, to determine the criteria for the opening of insolvency proceedings, it 
leads to the establishment of the principle of vis attractiva concursus in the area of justice as well.22 
As mentioned above, the Insolvency Regulation does not directly address the issue, but this 
conclusion is based on the fact that it takes for granted the doctrine of Gourdain vs. Nadler, and 
that another interpretation does not avoid loopholes in the area of justice, which is the objective 
of the Community.23 Recital 4 of the Insolvency Regulation reinforces and justifies this last 
argument by highlighting the need to overcome forum shopping in the internal market; it can be 
achieved by harmonizing rules on this matter and, hence, there must be no room left for the 
application of national laws. 
 
Nevertheless, the enigma remained open and all three interpretations were feasible, which 
brought about the need for the intervention of the Community. Seagon vs. Deko Marty Belgium is 
the answer to this need; it does not solve all the problems that the Regulation’s silence poses, but 
one thing is clear from now on, that Article 3 establishes the vis attractiva concursus principle.  
                                                        
20See LÜKE (1999, p. 483). 
 
21Articles 25 and 26 of the Insolvency Regulation improve the relationship to the Brussels I Regulation, which was 
also established by the Preliminary Drafts, but without stating the non recognition causes. See SPELLENBERG (1988, 
pp. 391-401). Contrary to the application of the Brussels I Regulation to ancillary proceedings to the insolvency 
are HAUBOLD (2002, p. 160), and VIRGÓS SORIANO, GARCIMARTÍN ALFÉREZ (2003, pp. 61-63). 
 
22See CAMPUZANO DÍAZ (2004, pp. 136-138); CARBALLO PIÑEIRO (2005, pp. 166-167); DUURSMA-KEPPLINGER (2002, 
pp. 419-445); ESPINIELLA MENÉNDEZ (2006, pp. 70-78); HAUBOLD (2002, p. 162); LEIPOLD (2001, pp. 231-234); LORENZ 
(2005, pp. 114-120); VIRGOS SORIANO (1995, pp. 51-69); VIRGOS SORIANO (1998, pp. 14-15); VIRGOS SORIANO, 
GARCIMARTÍN ALFÉREZ (2003, pp. 61-71); WILLEMER (2006, pp. 57-59); WELLER (2004, p. 415).  
 
23See VIRGOS, SCHMIT Report, para. 77. 
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3. The End of the Uncertainty: Seagon vs. Deko Marty Belgium 
 
3.1. Preliminaries 
 
The fact that the German courts submitted this issue to the ECJ did not come as a surprise. 
German law casts doubts on the accordance of the vis attractiva concursus with due process rights, 
since it means that the case is no longer brought before the courts designated by ordinary 
jurisdiction criteria, but before the forum concursus; such an exception may surprise the defendant 
and, thus, compromise his or her due process rights. In 2001 the German legislator modified 
international jurisdiction rules on the opening of an insolvency proceeding and on corresponding 
ancillary proceedings, introducing for the first time a limited vis attractiva concursus. But the 
aforementioned doubts determined the scope of the legal reform: only claims against the 
liquidator may be brought before the forum concursus, but not if the insolvency administrator is 
the plaintiff.24  
 
Avoidance proceedings clearly exemplify these doubts on the vis attractiva concursus’ compliance 
with due process rights: characterized as ancillary to insolvency proceedings, they are attracted 
by insolvency courts where vis attractiva is accepted; on the contrary, in Germany, defendants’ 
interests come to the forefront and the action must be brought before his or her domicile court, 
without regarding the effectiveness of the insolvency proceeding. This issue is well exemplified 
by a case brought before the German Bundesgerichtshof in 2003, before the Insolvency Regulation 
came into force; it decided on an avoidance proceeding concerning the sale of an immovable 
located in Spain celebrated between the German debtor and a third person with domicile in 
Thailand. The issue to be solved by the German High Court was the attraction of the claim to the 
German insolvency court by interpreting the criteria set out in 2001 as laying down a limited vis 
attractiva concursus comprehending avoidance proceedings as well. But the Bundesgerichtshof 
decided that the applicable jurisdiction criterion submitted the matter to defendant’s domicile 
courts, in this case Thailand, highlighting that his or her due process rights were at stake.25   
 
With the Insolvency Regulation in force, Seagon vs. Deko Marty Belgium has brought about the 
chance to raise the issue before the ECJ: in this case there are two opposing interpretations of the 
vis attractiva concursus, the Belgian point of view accepts it and the German does not, resulting in 
a negative conflict of jurisdiction. Both courts applied their own rules on international 
jurisdiction, in accordance with the first aforementioned interpretation of the Insolvency 
Regulation’s silence on the matter. The prejudicial question was posed by the German courts: 
once the Belgian courts rejected the action because they do not have international jurisdiction, 
                                                        
24See § 19a ZPO, reformed on 27th of June 2001. See on the former situation GRASMANN (1990, pp. 175-176).  
 
25BGH of 27th May 2003, IX ZR 203/02, commented by MÖRSDORF-SCHULTE (2004, pp. 31-40). 
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although they were the defendant’s domicile courts, the German administrator only had one 
option, to bring the proceeding before the German courts, although according to their own rules 
they do not have jurisdiction either. With such a deadlock it is possible to identify a case for a 
forum necessitatis: a plaintiff’s due process rights demand a court to bring his or her case, and not 
finding it within the legal system, it is necessary to provide him or her with one. This was the 
opinion of the German liquidator, who brought the avoidance proceedings before the Marburg 
Landesgerichtshof, instead of the Marburg Amtsgerichtshof, which was dealing with the insolvency 
proceeding, because German territorial jurisdiction rules do not allow the vis attractiva concursus 
either. Eventually, the debate around the silence of the Regulation leads the Bundesgerichtshof to 
the ECJ.    
 
The first prejudicial question posed by the Bundesgerichtshof tackles the quid of the debate, if 
decisions deriving directly from the bankruptcy, and closely connected with such proceedings, 
are within the scope of the Insolvency Regulation, and, therefore, if Article 3 of the same 
Regulation is applicable to internationally allocate an avoidance proceeding. If the ECJ’s reply 
were negative, the German High Court posed a second prejudicial question, i.e. if such 
proceedings are not within the scope of the Insolvency Regulation, would they be within the 
scope of the Brussels I Regulation? A negative answer to this question would make the ECJ 
change its own doctrine as stated in Gourdain vs. Nadler, leading us to the present situation, when 
national law is applicable with all the aforementioned problems and in the need to establish a 
forum necessitatis.  
 
3.2.The ruling 
 
a. Some Ancillary Claims Are Within the Insolvency Regulation  
 
Seagon vs. Deko Marty Belgium is in tune with Gourdain vs. Nadler, but the ECJ goes one step 
further by allocating claims deriving directly from insolvency proceedings within the scope of the 
Insolvency Regulation, calling on the effect utile it must accomplish.26 The whole problem is posed 
as a matter of dialectics between the Brussels I Regulation and the Insolvency Regulation; in fact, 
the decision neither addresses the problem of defendant’s due process rights behind the German 
international jurisdiction criteria, nor deepens the approach taken in Gourdain vs. Nadler in order 
to decide which claims are included within the scope of the vis attractiva concursus, an issue which 
is discussed below. But it clearly states that Article 3 of the Insolvency Regulation is the rule to 
apply in order to determine the international jurisdiction on claims deriving from insolvency 
proceedings. According to the ECJ, the legislative silence results in the provision on the vis 
attractiva concursus, on the grounds that it meets the objectives of insolvency proceedings and 
avoids forum shopping, and due to the wording employed by Recital 6 and Article 25.1,II of the 
Insolvency Regulation. All of these arguments are already familiar and, therefore, welcome, 
although they still leave room for doubt.  
                                                        
26See Deko Marty Belgium, para. 21.  
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The first reason regards the basis of the vis attractiva concursus principle, namely the efficiency 
and effectiveness of insolvency proceedings.27 This relationship is essential to state that the 
Regulation lays down the vis attractiva concursus, inasmuch as it is the grounds of the teleological 
interpretation made by the ECJ.28 But this is not a decisive reason when interpreting Article 3 of 
the Insolvency Regulation, first of all because there are different means to achieve these objectives 
and vis attractiva concursus in particular could have been set aside by the Community (as seems to 
be the case) for the sake of other objectives, such as preserving defendants’ due process rights;29 
secondly, because improving the efficiency of vis attractiva would lead to bringing any claim 
concerning a debtor’s estate before the insolvency court, which is clearly not the intention of the 
Insolvency Regulation. Anyway, this connection among the objectives behind the Insolvency 
Regulation and the vis attractiva concursus principle is the starting point to find other supporting 
reasons for this interpretation.  
 
The submission of avoidance proceedings to the forum concursus is seen by the ECJ as a way of 
avoiding forum shopping.30 But this reason is not totally convincing. The Insolvency Regulation 
has harmonized the conflict rules and thus the risk of forum shopping has been so far 
neutralized: it does not matter which courts the avoidance proceedings are brought before, either 
those of the defendant’s domicile or the insolvency court, because they have to apply the same 
law, the one determined by Articles 4.2,m) and 13 of the Insolvency Regulation.31 In this context, 
forum shopping may arise from the establishment of vis attractiva concursus in the Insolvency 
Regulation, in so far as avoidance proceedings are submitted to the lex fori concursus and the 
debtor may try to change his or her centre of main interests in order to find a more ‘generous’ law 
with acts that are detrimental to creditors.32  
 
                                                        
27See Recitals 2 and 8 of the Insolvency Regulation. See commenting Deko Marty Belgium CAMPUZANO DÍAZ (2009, 
p. 99). 
 
28See Deko Marty Belgium, para. 22.  
 
29The fact that a strict universalism model has not been adopted, but a modified universalism one instead,  
perfectly exemplifies that efficiency and effectiveness of insolvency proceedings may step back when it comes to 
protecting other interests. See FEHRENBACH (2009, p. 494). 
 
30See Deko Marty Belgium, para. 23-24. 
 
31They are not universal, but it does not matter in order to highlight how weak is the argument used by the ECJ, 
because other cases fall outside the objectives of the Community. 
 
32See this reason in THOLE (2006, p. 1419). The legislative option for a material concept makes it possible to avoid 
these problems and confirms that the lex fori concursus is the proper law applicable to avoidance proceedings; it is 
much more difficult to manipulate, which may easily happen with the law applicable to the challenged act. See on 
these problems, CARBALLO PIÑEIRO (2005, pp. 181-291).   
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The wording of Recital 6 and Article 25 of the Insolvency Regulation following Gourdain vs. 
Nadler is, of course, central to tip the balance in favour of the vis attractiva concursus. But Article 
25(1)(2) regards ‘judgments deriving directly from the insolvency proceedings and which are 
closely linked with them, even if they were handed down by another court’,33 meaning a court 
different from the insolvency court. This statement is incongruent with the idea that the 
Insolvency Regulation determines the international jurisdiction of those decisions by accepting 
the vis attractiva concursus. This point does not mean that these claims are not included within the 
scope of the Regulation, but it casts doubts on the determination of their international jurisdiction 
by this legal instrument.34  
 
These doubts are worked out by the ECJ without much attention, and it even avoids mentioning 
Article 18.2 of the Insolvency Regulation, which allows the liquidator in a territorial insolvency 
proceeding to bring ‘any action to set aside which is in the interest of the creditors’ before the 
courts of a different Member State from the one opening the insolvency proceeding. The 
Advocate General did regard this power of the liquidator,35 but the ECJ has ignored this Article, 
maybe for the sake of clarity when drawing a conclusion from this case: avoidance proceedings 
are included within the scope of the Insolvency Regulation, and their international jurisdiction is 
determined by its Article 3.36  
 
b. Does Article 3 set out an exclusive forum? 
 
Articles 18.2 and 25(1)(II) of the Insolvency Regulation support the interpretation that the vis 
attractiva concursus is not established by this instrument, because both take into account claims 
submitted to courts which are not the insolvency court.37 A slightly different interpretation of 
these Articles holds that the vis attractiva concursus must not be treated as an exclusive forum, so 
that the claim may be brought not only before the forum concursus, but also before any other 
competent court according to the ordinary jurisdiction criteria.38 As the General Advocate points 
out,39 flexibility on international jurisdiction serves the efficiency and effectiveness in which vis 
                                                        
33Italics are mine. 
 
34As defended by BARIATTI (2009, pp. 23-38). 
 
35See Advocate General’s Opinion, para. 66. 
 
36Unless the ECJ has not taken into account Article 18.2 of the Insolvency Regulation because it deals with the 
powers of a liquidator named in a territorial insolvency proceeding and not in a universal one, as in Seagon vs. 
Deko Marty Belgium. See CORSINI (2008, p. 435). Nevertheless, this interpretation is incompatible with the approach 
of the ECJ, specifying the scope of both European Regulations. 
 
37See FEHRENBACH (2009, p. 495). 
 
38See HAU (2008, pp. 78-125). 
 
39See Advocate General’s Opinion, rec. 68.  
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attractiva concursus and insolvency proceedings are based, to the extent that it allows the plaintiff, 
usually the liquidator, to decide where to bring the claim in accordance with the interests of the 
insolvency proceeding, which do not always lead to the forum concursus. For instance, this may 
happen when the decision rendered by the insolvency court has to be enforced in another 
country; consequently, bringing the claim directly to the State where it has to be enforced may 
not only save costs, but may also make the enforcement feasible if the decision rendered by the 
insolvency court is not recognized on the grounds of the exorbitance of the vis attractiva concursus.  
 
This last objection can no longer work within the European Union, as the decisions of the ECJ are 
binding on all Member States and Seagon vs. Deko Marty Belgium clearly stands for the vis 
attractiva concursus.40 Moreover, according to it, the reference of Article 25(1)(2) to ‘another court’ 
is interpreted as regarding a matter of territorial jurisdiction, and not of international 
jurisdiction.41 Nevertheless, the convenience of the flexibility granted to the liquidator while 
lodging a claim still raises some thoughts on the character of the international jurisdiction 
criterion. Its exclusiveness within the Community is granted by being the only available forum, 
but this character should not be projected on the recognition of decisions coming from third 
countries; exclusive criteria are difficult to justify nowadays,42 but especially when the same 
reasons grounding a jurisdiction criterion advise to bring the claim before other courts. 
 
So far, Seagon vs. Deko Marty Belgium does not end the debate, from now on focused on 
determining which are the claims deriving from the insolvency proceedings and closely linked 
with them. The fact that the ECJ will fill this loophole does not mean that this leaking method 
deserves the utmost critique. 
  
 
4. Vis attractiva concursus as International Jurisdiction Criterion 
 
4.1. In General 
 
Rules on international jurisdiction usually have a well defined scope of application in so far as 
the subject matter is thoroughly analyzed in order to accomplish the interests at stake and to 
ensure that there are minimum contacts between their scope and the selected jurisdiction. On the 
contrary, vis attractiva concursus takes into account many different legal situations, which render 
this analysis more complicated. In fact, the involvement of so many legal situations, all of them 
affected by the debtor’s insolvency, poses a previous question of distinguishing among 
substantive and procedural issues; in order to avoid this issue, the solution is provided by the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
40See ESPINIELLA MENÉNDEZ (2009, pp. 191-192); MANKOWSKI, WILLEMER (2009, p. 675). 
 
41See Deko Marty Belgium, para. 27.  
 
42See critical FERNÁNDEZ ARROYO (2006, pp. 80-126). 
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applicable law, the lex fori concursus, which deals not only with substantive issues, but also with 
procedural ones. Thus, vis attractiva concursus is a jurisdiction criterion, a forum connexitatis, but it 
is set out by the applicable insolvency law, due to the fact that it aims to simplify the insolvency 
proceeding by not distinguishing substantive from procedural law issues. 
 
The problems of distinguishing substantive from procedural issues in Insolvency laws are behind 
the proposal to always determine international jurisdiction according to the applicable lex 
concursus, i.e. it does not matter that the action has been brought before the courts of a different 
State from the one where the insolvency proceeding has been opened, because the international 
jurisdiction of the first court is also determined according to the lex concursus.43 This proposal has 
the advantage of avoiding negative jurisdiction conflicts, but it disregards that the vis attractiva 
concursus is a rule on jurisdiction and as such determined by the lex fori processus, the procedural 
law of the seized court.  
 
The establishment of this jurisdiction criterion is based on the objectives that insolvency 
proceedings should achieve, i.e. efficiency and effectiveness. In order to meet them, it is not 
necessary to bring all the actions on the debtor’s estate before the same court, but there is no 
doubt that concentrating all the proceedings before the insolvency court not only saves costs to 
the insolvency estate, but it also benefits from its knowledge and familiarity with the debtor’s 
matters.44 Theoretically, the more actions are brought before the insolvency court, the more 
efficient and effective an insolvency proceeding is. But this concentration means that ordinary 
jurisdiction criteria are substituted in some cases by the forum concursus, putting at risk 
defendants’ due process rights; consequently, some claims must be set aside. In fact, legal 
differences on this jurisdiction criterion basically arise from which actions are attracted to the 
forum concursus, so that vis attractiva concursus can be absolute or restricted, depending on how 
wide this attraction is.    
 
As a territorial jurisdiction criterion, vis attractiva concursus is in accordance with due process 
rights, even when it is absolute because these rights are fulfilled by providing a court within the 
State. Things are different when insolvency is cross-border. In cases with international contacts, 
due process rights are only satisfied if international jurisdiction rules provide, on the one hand, 
that the plaintiff has a forum to attend his or her case, and, on the other hand, that the defendant 
has minimum contacts with the determined forum.45 Beyond both parameters, international 
jurisdiction rules may be deemed exorbitant. Taking into account these limits, an absolute vis 
                                                        
43See this approach in the sentence rendered by Oberlandesgericht Wien, 17th October 2003 (3 R 151/03). See also 
CONSALVI (2006, Nr. 4). 
 
44See PASTOR RIDRUEJO (1971, pp. 135-221). See recently and critically with these arguments, especially the one 
concerning the effectiveness to be achieved by the vis attractiva principle, ALONSO-CUEVILLAS SAYROL (2007, pp. 73-
82). 
 
45See FERNÁNDEZ ARROYO (2006, pp. 36-79).  
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attractiva on international jurisdiction is unacceptable, because it surprises the defendant. So far, 
only a restricted vis attractiva is internationally acceptable, and the question posed is which 
actions may be attracted before the forum concursus without infringing defendants’ due process 
rights.     
 
The most coherent rule on the vis attractiva concursus lists which actions are within its scope, thus 
providing juridical security to the system. This system was chosen by the Preliminary Drafts for 
an Insolvency Convention, but abandoned by lack of agreement. This enumeration poses some 
problems when they are determined by national law as well: each insolvency law has its own 
characteristics and, hence, its own actions, so that a list based on the own Insolvency law risks 
being incomplete. Moreover, the same rule may act as an indirect jurisdiction rule in order to 
determine whether to recognize a decision rendered by a foreign court with a different point of 
view on the claims absorbed by the forum concursus. This objection can be disregarded in so far as 
forum concursus is not deemed an exclusive criteria and, thus, it does not veto decisions coming 
from foreign courts different from the insolvency court. This can be complemented by a generic 
definition of claims included within the scope of vis attractiva concursus like the one stated by 
Gourdain vs. Nadler, in order to test the exorbitance of the vis attractiva concursus exercised by the 
foreign insolvency court. 
 
4.2. In the European Area of Justice: Meaning of Claims Deriving from the Insolvency 
proceedings and Closely Linked with Them  
 
After Seagon vs. Deko Marty Belgium and in the area of justice, the issue is which claims derive 
directly from the insolvency proceedings and are closely connected to them, therefore it is 
necessary to look deeper into Gourdain vs. Nadler. The case regarded a liability action against the 
de facto administrator of an insolvent society, who may have delayed the opening of the 
insolvency proceeding. The ECJ makes a characterization in casu taking into account that 
ordinary rules on legal standing, period of limitations, burden of proof and insolvency, are 
modified by the French Insolvency law: legal standing is granted only to the syndic, the period of 
limitations begins to run within the insolvency proceeding, the general manager is presumed to 
be liable, imposing on him or her the burden of proving that he or she acted with diligence, the 
recovery benefits all creditors of the insolvent society if the action succeeds; and it may imply the 
automatic opening of an insolvency proceeding regarding the manager’s estate. All in all, the ECJ 
held this liability action as deriving directly from the insolvency proceeding and closely linked 
with it.  
 
Nevertheless, this approach reveals its weakness when later French law modifies the action en 
comblement du passif, and its characterization as ‘insolvency matter’ is brought into question.46 In 
fact, Gourdain vs. Nadler has been strongly criticized as being based on apparent connections 
between the claim at hand and the insolvency proceeding; these are either met by most claims, 
once the insolvency proceeding is open, like the standing of the liquidator or the destination of 
                                                        
46See EBENROTH, KIESER (1988, pp. 19-48). 
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the recovery to satisfy all creditors; or they simply do not help to characterize the claim as being 
closely related to the insolvency proceeding, like the rule on burden of proof which is established 
in other liability actions as well.  
 
Shedding some light on the meaning of the aforementioned definition means going back to the 
origin of this issue, the specifying of the scope of the Brussels Convention, which makes the vis 
attractiva concursus a question of characterization, i.e. it boils down to qualifying claims as 
‘insolvency matter’. Article 4 of the Insolvency Regulation may help, to the extent that it 
enumerates some issues as governed by the lex fori concursus. Nevertheless, the interests involved 
in the determination of the applicable law are different from the ones involved in the 
determination of the international jurisdiction; in other words, the scope of the vis attractiva 
concursus does not depend on the conflict rules laid down by the Insolvency Regulation, but on 
the definition set out by Article 25 of the same Regulation, which is more restrictive because it is 
the result of specifying the scope of the Brussels Convention. Seagon vs. Deko Marty Belgium 
confirms that they are independent rules, to the extent that Article 4(2)(m) lays down the 
application of the lex fori concursus to ‘the rules relating to the voidness, voidability or 
unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to all the creditors’, but the ECJ does not even 
mentioned it while defending the attraction of these claims by the forum concursus.  
 
The ECJ is even clearer on the distinction among jurisdiction and conflict rules in German 
Graphics.47 The claim at hand, brought by the seller, regarded a reservation of title on an asset 
located within the State where the insolvency proceeding had been opened; hence, it may involve 
the application of Articles 4.2(b) and 7(1) of the Insolvency Regulation, both on the applicable law 
to the effects of an insolvency proceedings.48 But the ECJ clarifies that Article 4(2)(b) ‘only 
constitutes a rule intended to prevent conflicts of law’ and ‘has no effect on the scope of 
application of Regulation Nr. 44/2001’,49 namely it does not determine which are the claims 
related to the bankruptcy excluded from the Regulation Brussels I.   
 
So far and in order to determine which claims are related to insolvency proceedings and, thus, 
excluded from the Brussels Regulation, the approach taken by the ECJ in Gourdain vs. Nadler 
seems the only available. And it must be complemented by taking into account, firstly, that 
                                                        
47See ECJ 10th of September 2009, C-292/08, German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH vs. A. van der Schee, 
acting as liquidator of Holland Binding BV. 
 
48The case at hand did not fall within the scope of Article 7(1) of the Insolvency Regulation, which states that the 
seller’s rights based on the reservation of title clause shall not be affected by the opening of the proceedings if the 
asset in question is at that time located within the territory of a Member State other than the State of opening, i.e. 
these rights are immune to the insolvency proceeding. On the contrary, if the asset in question is located in the 
State of opening, the seller’s rights may be determined by the lex concursus. 
 
49See German Graphics, para. 37. 
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exclusions from the Brussels Regulation are to be restrictively interpreted50, and the scope of 
application of the Insolvency Regulation should not be broadly interpreted;51 and, secondly, that 
vis attractiva concursus is a jurisdiction criterion, governed thus by due process rights. 
Consequently, the answer to which international proceedings may be attracted to the forum 
concursus must also take into account if the parties to the proceeding could have advanced that 
the forum concursus was among the possible courts to decide on their conflict. This understood, 
the definition stated by Article 25(1)(2) of the Insolvency Regulation sets out the minimum 
contacts principle.52 Following these parameters, next paragraphs try to advance which is the 
scope of the international vis attractiva according to the ECJ.  
 
There should be beyond doubt that the forum concursus is the only court to bring claims 
concerning the opening of insolvency proceedings, their conduct and their closure, the ranking of 
creditors, or the lodging of claims against the debtor’s estate after the opening of the insolvency 
proceedings. The conduct of the insolvency proceeding includes any enforcement or provisional 
measure to be taken on the debtor's assets, since the objective is either to liquidate or to 
reorganize it, being it recently remembered by the ECJ in MG Probud.53 As a matter of fact, these 
issues are the insolvency proceedings and, thus, they can only be brought before the insolvency 
court. 
 
On the contrary, contractual, non contractual and in rem claims concerning debtor’s estate are not 
covered by the vis attractiva concursus, since they may be lodged regardless of insolvency 
proceedings.54 But if the opening of insolvency proceeding determines a modification of these 
matters, so that it gives rise to claims that only may be lodged after its commencement and in 
order to achieve its objectives, they should be held within the scope of the Insolvency Regulation. 
That is the case of claims arising from current contracts to which the debtor is a party at the 
opening of the insolvency proceeding, dealing with the liquidator’s powers to unilaterally decide 
on their confirmation or termination. Since these powers are granted to the liquidator only 
                                                        
50See JENARD Report, p. 131. 
 
51See German Graphics, para 25. 
 
52See CARBALLO PIÑEIRO (2009, pp. 26-32). 
 
53See ECJ 21st of January 2010, Case C-444/07, MG Probud Gdynia sp. z.o.o., commented by ESPINIELLA MENÉNDEZ 
(2010). 
 
54See VIRGOS, SCHMIT Report, para. 196. The ECJ has already deemed that these claims are not insolvency matter to 
the extent that the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation is applied in the following cases: ECJ 15th 
November 1983, Case C 288/82, F. Duijnstee vs. L. Goderbauer, on an action brought by the liquidator in order to 
recover an asset for the estate; 29th April 1999, Case C-267/97, Éric Coursier vs. Fortis Bank SA and M. Bellami, on 
the enforcement of a judgement ordering the payment of money after the closure of the insolvency proceeding; 
14th May 2009, Case C-180/06, R. Ilsinger vs. M. Dreschers, acting as administrator in the insolvency of Schlank & Schick 
GmbH, on the consumer nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. 
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because of the opening of the proceeding, such claims should be allocated within the scope of 
Article 3 of the Insolvency Regulation.  
 
The same has been held by the ECJ in SCT Industri vs. Alpenblumen.55 This case is about a decision 
denying the registration of ownership of shares in a company seated in a Member State, 
transferred by the liquidator to a company seated in another Member State, on the grounds that 
the liquidator’s powers have not been recognized. The company to which ownership was denied 
brought an in rem action against the company which transferred the shares via the liquidator 
appointed when it was insolvent. The prejudicial question posed to the ECJ regards the scope of 
Brussels I Regulation, to the extent that the insolvency proceeding at issue is already closed and 
the Insolvency Regulation is only applicable to those opened after its entry into force. So far, the 
issue regards the recognition of a decision rendered in a Member State on the grounds that the 
transfer of ownership is void because this State neither recognizes an insolvency proceeding 
opened in another Member State nor the appointment of a liquidator. Consequently, the claim 
arises from the modification on the debtor’s powers and the corresponding transfer to a 
liquidator due to the opening of an insolvency proceeding.56 SCT Industri vs. Alpenblumen decided 
on the non applicability of Brussels I Regulation, which after Seagon vs. Deko Marty Belgium means 
that claims arising from the effects of insolvency proceedings are within the scope of the Insolvency 
Regulation, but only when they are the cause of action.57  
 
All in all, problems should arise only from a small number of claims, which compose a sort of 
grey area. That seems to be the case of avoidance proceedings, as the German legislation 
exemplifies. There are already national decisions on the matter, excluding avoidance proceedings 
from the scope of the Brussels Convention,58 whose interpretation is now confirmed by the ECJ.59 
But an even more restrictive interpretation of Article 1(2)(b) of the Brussels Convention has been 
                                                        
55See C-111/08, SCT Industri Aktiebolag I likvidation vs. Alpenblumen Aktiebolag. 
 
56See SCT Industri vs. Alpenblumen, para. 27. 
 
57That is not the case in German Graphics, in which the ECJ states that the claim ‘brought by German Graphics 
sought only to ensure the application of the reservation of title clause in its own favour’ (see para. 31), i.e. it does 
not involve any insolvency effect.   
 
58Of this opinion see Tribunale di Torino, 22.12.1987, Riv.dir.int.pr.proc. 1989, p. 659-666; Italian Corte di Cassazione, 
21.4.1989, Nr. 1905, Riv.dir.int.pri.proc. 1990, p. 396-400); German Bundesgerichtshof, 11.1.1990, NJW 1990, pp. 990-
992, IPRax 1991, pp. 183-185, commented by FLESSNER, SCHULZ (1991, pp. 162-166), and WENNER (1990, pp. 429-
436); Bundesgerichtshof, 21.11.1996, RIW 1997, p. 428; Oberlandesgerichtshof Köln, 6.6.1997 
(http://www.justiz.nrw.de/RB/nrwe/olgs/koeln/j1997/3_U_139_96.html). See also DUURSMA-KEPPLINGER 
(2002, p. 441); GEIMER, SCHÜTZE (1997, p. 57); HAAS (1999, p. 1152); HAUBOLD (2002, p. 158, 162); KAYE (1987, p. 
131); SCHLOSSER (1975, p. 407); TRUNK (1998, p. 185).  
 
59See Seagon vs. Deko Marty Belgium, para. 28. 
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proposed, in order to understand avoidance proceedings within its scope as well.60 The main 
argument stands on the connection between avoidance proceedings and fraudulent transactions, 
the civil actio pauliana, which sets acts that are detrimental to creditors aside as well, but 
regardless of insolvency proceedings.  
 
The ECJ does not pay any attention to this connection, but instead to the link between avoidance 
and insolvency proceedings, highlighting that the action to set a transaction aside is governed by 
German Insolvency law. Specifically, it may only be brought by the liquidator ‘in the event of 
insolvency with the sole purpose of protecting the interests of the general body of creditors’.61 
Besides, it is intended ‘to increase the assets of the undertaking which is the subject of insolvency 
proceedings’.62 These remarks underline the close link of this claim with the objectives of 
insolvency proceedings,63 especially with the par condicio creditorum. Avoidance proceedings aim 
at avoiding variations on the ranking of creditors as predetermined by the legal system, in order 
to dilute the debtor’s insolvency among all creditors and not to compromise the economic 
system;64 thus, they cannot be lodged without the opening of an insolvency proceeding.65  
 
On the contrary, the civil actio pauliana is not governed by the Insolvency law, although this law 
may acknowledge it by entitling the liquidator to bring it on behalf of all creditors, as a 
complement to avoidance proceedings.66 Neither this taking it into account by the lex concursus 
nor the standing of the liquidator should be enough to allocate this claim within the scope of 
Article 3 of the Insolvency Regulation, so that it must be included within the scope of the Brussels 
I Regulation.67 But the fact that it is brought on behalf of all creditors may change this conclusion 
                                                        
60Contrary to this doctrine, HONORATI (1989, pp. 595-616); and with some nuances SCHMIDT (1990, p. 220). 
 
61See Deko Marty Belgium, para. 16. 
 
62See Deko Marty Belgium, para. 17. 
 
63Already highlighted by MERSCH (1983, p. 632); WESTBROOK (1991, pp. 500, 508-510).  
 
64See MANGANO (2004, passim);  TERRANOVA (1982, passim). 
 
65As mentioned in text, the protection of the defendant comes to the forefront in German law while allocating 
international jurisdiction to decide on avoidance proceedings, so that they are excluded from the vis attractiva 
concursus. This forum places the defendant either before the courts of the debtor’s center of main interest or before 
a debtor’s establishment, instead of his or her domicile. The issue is then if forum concursus may surprise the 
defendant, which seems doubtful in so far as he or she could have advanced its jurisdiction as both places have to 
be familiar to him or her while dealing with the debtor. See CARBALLO PIÑEIRO (2005, pp. 141-146). 
 
66As it is the case of the Spanish Insolvency Law, Article 71(6), or the German one, Articles 133 and 134, which 
have the same wording as Articles 3 and 4 of the Anfectungsgesetz or German Fraudulent Transactions Act.  
 
67See ECJ 10th of January 1990, Case C 115-88, Reichert c. Dresdner Bank, Rec. 1990, pp. 27-43. 
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by stating that it aims to protect the par condicio creditorum as well.68 Consequently, international 
jurisdiction on this claim should be determined either by the Brussels I Regulation, or by the 
Insolvency Regulation, depending on the assignment of the recovery, either to satisfy the creditor 
who lodges it, or to increase the debtor’s estate. However, this approach does not agree with the 
established dialectics between both Regulation, so that its inclusion in the Brussels I Regulation 
means its exclusion from the other instrument.  
 
The intrinsic connection to insolvency proceedings can also be found in the case of liability claims 
against liquidators, because these claims have their cause of action in the appointment of the 
liquidator in order to manage the insolvency proceeding and, thus, to meet its objectives; 
consequently, they may only be lodged once the insolvency proceeding has been opened.69 These 
liability claims may arise from the general management of the liquidator damaging all creditors, 
but also from individual acts, i.e. because of the infringement of a duty which has damaged a 
creditor or a third person. In the first case, apart from deciding on their liability, the insolvency 
court must appoint a substitute, which makes it clear that there is an intrinsic link between this 
claim and the insolvency proceeding. But the same should be held regarding individual liability 
claims, because they arise from powers conferred to the liquidator by the opening of the 
insolvency proceeding. 
 
Paradoxically, the most complicated claim to be qualified is the one addressed by the ECJ in 
Gourdain vs. Nadler, a liability action arising from the insolvency of a company against its 
directors because they have not opened the proceeding in time, or have delayed its opening. 
Although some scholars follow the policy set up by the ECJ,70 others have put this allocation into 
question,71 not only because they hold that the ECJ’s analysis was superficial, but also because 
these claims are part of the Company law rules aiming at protecting creditors: they are 
coordinated with preventive measures such as the minimum capital necessary to set up a 
company, which are within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation, making it advisable not to split 
both measures by submitting liability claims to the lex concursus. But the precedent set up by 
Gourdain vs. Nadler, the fact that this action aims to avoid a bigger loss and, thus, to increase the 
debtor’s assets, and that it may be lodged only after the opening of the insolvency proceeding, 
seem to indicate that it is going to be deemed an insolvency matter as well.72
                                                        
68See of this opinion CARBALLO PIÑEIRO (2005, p. 169-172). Contrary to it see ESPINIELLA MENÉNDEZ (2004, p. 341). 
 
69See, ESPINELLA MENÉNDEZ (2004, p. 343); WILLEMER (2006, pp. 380-393). 
 
70See BERMEJO GUTIÉRREZ, RODRÍGUEZ PINEAU (2006, pp. 1-41); ESPINIELLA MENÉNDEZ, (2004, pp. 341-342). 
 
71See WILLEMER (2006, pp. 212-312). 
 
72On the contrary, other liability actions against managers brought by the company or by individual creditors are 
not deemed within the scope of the vis attractiva principle, because they may be lodged regardless of the 
insolvency proceeding. See ESPINIELLA MENÉNDEZ, (2004, pp. 346-347); BERMEJO GUTIÉRREZ, RODRÍGUEZ PINEAU 
(2006, pp. 12-18); WILLEMER (2006, pp. 212-312). 
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5. Vis attractiva concursus as Territorial Jurisdiction Criterion 
 
The result of the ECJ’s interpretation is that Article 3 of the Insolvency Regulation sets out the vis 
attractiva concursus principle, but only regarding claims closely connected with the insolvency 
proceeding. It states an international jurisdiction criterion, which poses a problem of coordination 
with territorial jurisdiction rules. On the one hand, there are legal systems, like the German one, 
taking a reserved stance on it, so that there is no territorial jurisdiction according to national law, 
although having international jurisdiction according to Article 3. On the other hand, legal 
systems accepting a broad interpretation of the aforementioned principle, like the Spanish one, 
must deal with a territorial jurisdiction criterion broader in its scope than the international one. 
 
The first case has been addressed by the German Bundesgerichtshof immediately after the issuing 
of the ECJ’s decision on Seagon vs. Deko Marty Belgium; as results from this decision, the German 
insolvency court in the case at hand has international jurisdiction on the claim to set an act 
detrimental to creditors aside, but the German insolvency law does not contain a provision 
granting territorial jurisdiction to that court. In fact, this lack of coordination has been pointed 
out against the provision of the vis attactiva concursus principle as an international jurisdiction 
criterion; this principle aims at improving the efficiency of insolvency proceedings by 
concentrating all claims related to the bankruptcy before the court which supposedly has more 
information and knowledge on the debtor´s estate, that is to say, the court dealing with the 
insolvency. Contrary to this efficiency, German law points out that, even if vis attractiva were 
internationally accepted, such an efficiency would be lost at the level of territorial jurisdiction, 
where vis attractiva concursus is not implemented either73. But the loophole created by the ECJ’s 
decision has been closed by the German Supreme Court, by interpreting the German insolvency 
law as having a provision allocating the claim at hand before the insolvency courts.74 This 
interpretation is discussed,75 but it seems the path to follow taking into account the inadmissible 
gap. 
 
On the other hand, international vis attractiva may have a restricted scope of application than 
territorial vis attractiva. As mentioned, the Insolvency Regulation does not lay down territorial 
jurisdiction rules, submitting it to national laws. On the contrary, the Brussels I Regulation lays 
down international as well as territorial jurisdiction in some claims and in others territorial 
jurisdiction depends on national laws. Thus, when territorial jurisdiction is not determined by 
this Regulation, territorial vis attractiva concursus may bring the claim before the insolvency court, 
                                                        
73See KLÖHN, BERNER (2007, p. 1419). 
 
74After ECJ’s decision and in order to close the gap, the BGH has issued a judgment pointing out that Article 102 § 
1 InsO must be employed to determine territorial jurisdiction as well. See BGH 19.5.2009, IX ZR 39/06, NJW, 2009, 
pp. 2215-2217.  
 
75See FEHRENBACH (2009, pp. 497-498). 
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although its international jurisdiction is determined by the Brussels I Regulation and it is thus not 
included within the international vis attractiva.  
 
 
6. Final Remarks 
 
The silence of the Insolvency Regulation on the vis attractiva concursus principle led to 
contradictory interpretations, to which the ECJ has put an end by deciding that Article 3 sets up a 
limited vis attractiva concursus. This conclusion is based on the objectives of the Regulation, 
namely to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of insolvency proceedings in cross-border 
cases, and on the wording of Recital 6 and Article 25(1)(2) of the Insolvency Regulation 
transcribing the definition given in Gourdain vs. Nadler while stating which claims are excluded 
from the Brussels Convention, i.e. ‘claims deriving directly from the insolvency proceedings, and 
closely linked with them’. Although the decision of the ECJ has to be welcomed, it is not 
completely satisfactory to the extent that it opens Pandora’s box. From now on the debate focuses 
on allocating claims between the Brussels I and the Insolvency Regulations, at the risk of making 
ECJ intervention necessary whenever an insolvency proceeding is open and for any kind of 
claim. Fifteen years after the 1995 Brussels Convention was negotiated and taking into account 
the new legal situation, the European legislator should take the opportunity presented by the ECJ 
to reform the Regulation in order to clarify issues like the one here discussed. 
 
The European legislator should change Article 3 of the Insolvency Regulation to specify that it 
also addresses claims deriving from insolvency proceedings, and closely linked with them. 
Following this statement, the new paragraph should enumerate which claims are included, as 
Article 4 does for the applicable law. The already well-known definition stated by Gourdain vs. 
Nadler arises from the objective of the Regulation Brussels I as to comprehend all civil and 
commercial matters, which advises a restrictive interpretation of matters excluded from its scope 
of application. The conflicts of the vis attractiva concursus principle with due process rights make 
it even clearer that these claims have to match the objectives of the insolvency proceeding and 
they may be brought only as part of this proceeding.  
 
Apart from the opening, the conduct and the closure of insolvency proceedings, the ranking of 
creditors, or the lodging of claims against the debtor’s estate after the opening of the insolvency 
proceedings, which can only be decided by the insolvency court, the list should include claims 
arising from the effects of insolvency proceedings on the debtor’s powers, like the liquidator’s 
powers to terminate a contract to which the debtor is a party at the time of the opening of the 
proceeding, as well as liability claims against the liquidator, and avoidance proceedings. 
Eventually, the claims on wrongful trading against managers of the insolvent company are 
certainly controversial: on the one hand, they are closely related to the Company law rules 
aiming at protecting creditors; on the other hand, the ECJ has already allocated them outside the 
scope of the Brussels Convention and Seagon vs. Deko Marty Belgium does not change this 
outcome. Thus, they already are within the scope of the vis attractiva concursus; besides, 
compelling managers to take into account the interest of creditors, which is to open the 
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proceeding as soon as an insolvency situation is clear, accomplishes insolvency proceedings 
objectives as well. The many interests involved in these relationships could make this list change 
provided that the European legislator decides to intervene to assess the interests at hand. 
Meanwhile, the delimitation criterion set up by the ECJ excludes from the Insolvency Regulation 
only actions which may be lodged regardless of the opening of an insolvency proceeding. 
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